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Cross-Border Trade, Insecurity and the Role of Customs: Some Lessons 
from Six Field Studies in (Post-)Conflict Regions 
 
Thomas Cantens and Gaël Raballand 
 
 
Summary 
 
Africa, and especially the Sahel, has experienced frequent recurrences of armed conflicts 
and terrorist acts in the last decade. This paper is based on six field studies, in Chad, Mali, 
Sudan, Tunisia, Libya and the Central African Republic. It reflects on the governance of trade 
in border regions during a (post-)conflict situation, exploring the practices and strategies of 
customs officials operating at insecure borders. It demonstrates the unintended 
consequences of security policies – especially on trade, and consequently on revenue 
generation. It further shows how customs administrations de facto leave it to customs officers 
on the ground and importers to agree on an acceptable tax burden to prevent smuggling and 
a new upsurge in violence to a certain extent. Idiosyncratic and pragmatic approaches by 
customs seem to play a major role at the local level.  
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6 
Introduction 
 
This reflection is located at the intersection of two questions related to development that are 
usually treated separately. On the one hand, development and security form a nexus that 
has been widely explored by researchers for more than 20 years. On the other hand, more 
recently development and taxation have been interconnected. There is a strong emphasis in 
Africa on the need to collect more revenue to invest sustainably in poverty reduction.1 
Despite ambitious targets (an average increase in the tax/GDP ratio of 4 percentage points), 
results have been rather disappointing for possibly two main reasons: (i) instability and 
insecurity have spread all over Africa, impeding tax collection; (ii) a top-down approach of 
reforms that do not take into account the need for staff incentives, and therefore may lead to 
limited results. 
 
Trade taxes continue to account for between 30 and 50 per cent of total state revenue in 
Africa, making the role of customs critical for security, and revenue collection. Usually the 
focus is on a top-down approach to customs reform, considering a fragile environment an 
opportunity to start with a blank page for setting up a new institution. There is little literature 
on security, customs and trade; observations made in the field in these remote and conflict-
prone regions are even scarcer.  
 
As will be discussed in the following section, customs officers operating at borders, as a part 
of the state, are invisible. Either a reflection is policy-oriented – conducted at state-level, 
linking instability and state-building through the relations between taxation, revenue 
collection and security (and sometimes the role of foreign aid in this context); or more 
sociological, aiming to describe the reality of governance at the border, to showcase ‘hybrid’ 
governance from the end-user perspective in case studies of specific insecure borderlands. 
 
The main added value of this paper is that it present facts on revenue collection in conflict-
prone regions in Africa, and paves the way for discussion on (in)security, cross-border trade 
and the role of customs. This paper is a preliminary reflection, drawing lessons from six field 
missions conducted in fragile border regions – in northern Mali, at Chad’s border on Lake 
Chad, at the Tunisia-Libya border from both Tunisian and Libyan sides, at Sudan’s border 
with Chad in West Darfur, and in the northern borderlands of the Central African Republic 
neighbouring Chad and Cameroon (see maps in Appendix). Despite the situation differing 
from one country to another, common questions emerge on how to restore the authority of 
the state in areas of insecurity, and on the role to be played by state administrations – 
particularly customs in this context. This paper is part of an ongoing research project on the 
role and practices of customs in conflict-prone regions, because customs is a state 
institution, combining coercion of and bargaining with economic actors. The paper does not 
address the question of how to restore a fully functioning customs administration in conflict-
prone regions, but how the security, economic and institutional environments affect customs 
revenue collection across the continent in six bordering regions at the time when pressure is 
mounting for customs to collect more revenue (even in these environments).  
 
Given the risks attached to these environments and the difficulty of access to the field, a 
basic methodology was adopted as a first step. The choice of areas for fieldwork was 
opportunistic, based on safety and the importance of trade flows, because it is difficult to 
make observations on the ground in unstable regions. The current sample of border regions 
covers some of the major trade routes affected by security crisis in Northern Africa, Sahel 
and Central Africa.  
 
                                                          
1  With this end in view, the Addis Tax Initiative (ATI), a multi-stakeholder partnership of development partners and partner 
countries, was launched in Addis Ababa in July 2015, and includes over 40 countries and organisations. 
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In terms of methodology, fieldwork was conducted with the support of national customs – 
without this it would have been impossible to travel in those regions. However, anonymous 
interviews and formal meetings were conducted between July 2015 and January 2017 with 
traders, smugglers, transporters, police and army forces, state representatives, and militants 
in some cases.  
 
The key messages of this paper are as follows: 
 
 Customs administrations are flexible in conflict-prone borderlands, and tailor the fiscal 
burden to make it acceptable to local economic operators. The acceptability of taxation 
levels is to some extent negotiated with importers, to avoid or contain smuggling and 
boost local economic activity.  
 Trade activities are resilient. In most cases trade still flows across conflict-prone 
territories despite violence. This means that traders pay a given price for security, or 
conclude alliances with violent groups. In cases where state actors have been replaced 
by non-state actors, the latter still ensure that crossings of goods generate resources 
through an informal type of taxation. Trade resilience can be explained by the fact that, 
irrespective of whether the actors are rebels/militias or state institutions, armed groups 
always need supplies. However, and possibly even more significantly, trade is resilient 
because all the armed groups want it to be resilient: controlling trade and ensuring that 
trade flows remain effective is a sign of governance capacity (and revenue) for those who 
aim to rule a territory.  
 The local importance of customs in insecure areas is due to that administration’s position 
on trade flows, and its role in supplying cash for other state actors and local authorities. 
Customs is usually the most important state institution dealing with traders and 
middlemen, such as brokers and hauliers. Middlemen develop a relationship with and 
negotiate with customs. This is important in cases where the state’s presence is restored 
at fragile borders.  
 Finally, traders may finance violent activities. Terrorist groups may also pay traders for 
intelligence to enable them to slip across borders. There appear to have been cases in 
northern Nigeria where Boko Haram paid traders to become informants. The same 
phenomenon was reported by Timbuktu residents in Mali. 
 
This paper is set out as follows. Section 1 proposes a general review of the literature on 
cross-border trade, and the role of the state in insecure borderlands. Section 2 summarises 
the trade and security environment of customs administration in each area of fieldwork. It 
aims to highlight the main differences between customs administrations. The third section 
describes the impact of security on cross-border trade in the selected regions. It also shows 
how the traditional security response may have some unintended consequences that are 
detrimental to rebuilding the state in border regions. Section 4 presents some observations 
on customs practices developed in the field to accommodate conflict/post-conflict situations. 
The final section provides a conclusion and some areas for further research. 
 
 
1  Cross-border trade and customs in insecure 
areas 
 
The relationship between the state, fiscal administrations, security and cross-border trade is 
analysed through three main approaches. 
 
The first approach involves the general context of customs reforms. The weakness of border 
enforcement has been identified as one of the main causes for informal cross-border trade 
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(Golub 2015). Informal trade is considered to occur in the margins, and to be something that 
needs to be reduced as much as possible for two main reasons: causing losses in revenue 
collection, and, more generally, as being some kind of challenge to state authority (Cantens 
et al. 2015). However, in developing countries informal businesses account for up to half the 
economic activity (La Porta and Shleifer 2014). Amin and Hoppe (2013), Ayadi et al. (2014), 
Brenton et al. (2014) and Bensassi et al. (forthcoming) demonstrated that informal cross-
border trade in the Cameroon-Nigeria border, Tunisia-Libya border and East Africa is the 
most important income-generating activity, and consequently has a major impact on poverty 
reduction despite the fact that losses to the Treasury may be significant.2  
 
A second approach is more sociological, based on what end-users experience at the border 
– concluding alliances, or negotiating with state and non-state actors regarding the 
governance of borders. Anthropological and geographical approaches highlight the network 
effects of informal trade (Walther 2009, 2015), and the hybrid model of governance that 
informal cross-border trade creates (Titeca and Flynn 2014). The second approach shows 
how informal cross-border trade is tolerated by national and local authorities to ensure 
income generation for the local population. It further demonstrates how informal cross-border 
trade is a local response to distrust of the national authorities. In some cases the state may 
be perceived as illegitimate: informal cross-border trade, by undermining the state, is 
therefore a way to fight it. This study also shows how taxation levels are negotiated locally 
(Roitman 2007; Titeca and Flynn 2014; Reyntjens 2014). It goes on to illustrate how informal 
trade is a means of surviving, and how non-state institutions can emerge in the regulation of 
the border (Raeymaekers 2010). It also highlights possible collusion between some state 
institutions and some large informal traders. However, this literature does not examine the 
role of customs in detail as it is considered a state institution, nor the role of fiscal 
administrations within a context of organised violence. 
 
A third approach directly addresses the work and practice of civil servants in general, and 
customs officials in particular. This literature is mainly focused on points of entry like ports 
and airports, either to analyse the real governance of international trade (Chalfin 2004, 2008, 
2010; Cantens 2012, 2013, 2015), or to address the question of corruption (Cantens et al. 
2010; Raballand and Rajaram 2013) and discuss anti-corruption policies in customs 
(Cantens and Polner 2016). However, the role of customs officers in insecure areas has 
never been addressed. 
 
To some extent the literature dealing with borders, taxation and organised violence often 
adopts two contrasting perspectives, either ‘from below’ (giving more prominence to the 
experience of end-users (traders, transporters)), or ‘from above’ (from a state perspective). 
Security in developing countries has been widely addressed from a state-centric perspective, 
as shown by an exhaustive review of literature on ‘hybrid security arrangements in fragile 
and conflict-affected spaces’ by Luckham and Kirk (2012). Even if the state is represented as 
a body affected by violence and corruption, it is still represented as a body – civil servants 
are absent or left in the margins in these two poles of literature. Two exceptions should be 
noted, beyond African borders. Firstly, Klem (2012) gives an account of the role and 
practices of civil servants in a crisis zone in Sri Lanka. Sugget (2005), an Australian customs 
officer, describes his experience as a customs expert participating in state-building in East 
Timor in 1999.  
 
The academic literature agrees on the way state and non-state actors participate in this 
hybrid or negotiated governance of cross-border trade, as the main economic resource and 
the most easily taxable in the context of insecure areas. The interest in this hybridity in times 
of conflict has been driven recently by the influence of Tilly on academics, regarding the 
formation of the state through war, gaining prominence on the Weberian model (Meagher 
                                                          
2  For example, losses in Tunisia are estimated to be a quarter of the revenue collected by customs (Ayadi et al. 2014). 
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2012). However, focusing on the loss of power and authority by state services, and the 
hybrid/negotiated governance of the border, has sometimes blurred the fact that within any 
negotiation there are at least two parties. The perspective of civil servants – in this case 
customs officers operating at borders in insecure areas – seems to be underestimated. It is 
still important to explore their practices and strategies, as they are a concrete part of the 
governance de facto adopted in insecure areas.  
 
 
2  Brief presentation of case studies 
 
The situation of customs administrations operating at borders differs from one country to 
another, but at least two common points have been observed that contribute to the general 
description of border trade and management in the six selected regions. 
 
In all cases, smugglers of consumer goods – whose activities constitute the core interest of 
our study – are mainly focused on specific goods for home consumption (textiles, flour, 
vegetable oil, coffee, tea, agricultural goods and home appliances); fuel and cigarettes are 
commonly the most heavily-taxed goods smuggled by these traders. It has not been 
observed or reported that these smugglers of consumer goods, the majority of informal 
traders in these areas, smuggle high-value goods like gold, or goods subject to special 
restrictions like weapons or drugs. 
 
Smugglers may have means of transport (donkeys, pick-up vehicles) that allow them some 
flexibility to cross borders and bypass the control of customs. However, in terms of revenue 
collection a general customs strategy is to be located at trade hubs, the border cities to which 
commodity flows converge before being unloaded and dispatched to surrounding areas or 
sold in markets to urban and rural populations. Insecurity and army patrols in no-go zones 
are the second reason forcing smugglers not to move too far away from the usual and most 
frequented roads. 
 
Table 1 summarises the specificities of customs’ actions, trade practices3 and insecurity from 
a customs perspective, providing a broad overview of the six case studies. 
 
 
 
                                                          
3  Trade practices defined in this paper relate to goods that are neither illegal nor subject to specific regimes or 
authorisations. 
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Table 1 Specificities of customs’ actions, trade practices and insecurity from a 
customs perspective 
 Customs administration Trade practices Insecurity issues 
Tunisia 
 
Ras-Jedir - 
border with 
Libya 
At the customs bureau located on the 
border at Ras-Jedir, in charge of 
controlling passengers and cargo, 
customs controls the closure of 
armoured gates on the road crossing 
the border. 
 
Customs outposts are located along 
the border with Libya, from which 
customs can organise patrols. 
 
Trucks, individual vehicles 
and individuals are used to 
carry commodities.  
 
Pick-up vehicles are used to 
smuggle goods in the desert. 
 
Currency exchange is highly 
developed in the border city 
of Ben Guerdane. 
The main threat is terrorist groups 
that come from Libya to attack 
Tunisian cities (like Ben 
Guerdane in 2016), and people 
wanted for terrorist activities who 
escape from Tunisia and go to 
Libya. 
 
A second specific insecurity 
concern is linked to smuggling 
activities: the population of Ben 
Guerdane is highly dependent on 
cross-border trade activities. Any 
closure of the border or changes 
in Libyan trade control policy 
cause popular unrest on the 
Tunisian side in the city of Ben 
Guerdane. 
Libya  
 
Ras-Jedir - 
border with 
Tunisia 
Despite the current Libyan state 
being under reconstruction, the 
customs administration benefits from 
relative institutional stability.  
 
At the border with Tunisia, Libyan 
customs is represented by units with 
some personnel who are native of 
the area. Libyan customs has 
launched an important recruitment 
campaign among members of armed 
groups. 
Cross-border trade activities 
are similar to those in Tunisia. 
 
However, there is no border 
city acting as a trade hub, so 
cargo spreads all over the 
territory and alongside the 
Tripolitan Road to Tripoli.  
Security concerns are related to 
terrorism and the current 
fragmentation of Libyan territory. 
Access to certain parts of territory 
are still ruled by militias (katibas); 
this is still a potential obstacle for 
the full deployment of a national 
administration. 
Mali4 
 
Timbuktu and 
Gao - 
Northern Mali 
In 2012 customs administration, like 
other state services including the 
army, left the area ruled by rebels 
and jihadist groups. In 2015 the 
customs administration progressively 
sent staff to Timbuktu and Gao. 
However, customs administration is 
not present at the border with 
Mauritania and Algeria. 
 
The main objective of customs is to 
contain informal trade, particularly 
trade flows coming from Algeria -
where some consumer goods benefit 
from state subsidies. The concern is 
that necessities that are smuggled 
into northern trade hubs (Timbuktu, 
Gao) are resold in southern markets, 
where imported commodities from 
Sénégal and Côte d’Ivoire are 
submitted to higher legal taxation. 
Mali is a landlocked country.  
 
Two main points of entry - 
Kayes and Sikasso-Zegoua in 
the southern part of the 
country - process most trade 
flows from Senegal and Côte 
d’Ivoire. 
 
Commodities enter northern 
Mali through three routes:  
from Mauritania to Timbuktu, 
from Algeria (Tamanrasset) 
through Kidal, and 
from Algeria and other 
northern African countries 
(Libya, Egypt) through Niger 
and Menaka.  
 
Cities like Timbuktu and Gao 
in north Mali are historical 
trade cities, where traders’ 
communities are important 
and markets attract nomadic 
and rural populations. 
 
Trucks are used to trade with 
Algeria; pick-ups are more 
used for trade between 
Timbuktu and Mauritania. 
The level of insecurity is still high 
in Northern Mali due to the 
presence of armed groups whose 
weapons can be very 
sophisticated; this is an obstacle 
to full deployment of customs 
units. 
Chad 
 
Bol -  
Lake Chad 
Customs administration is under the 
authority of the Ministry of Finance. 
However, many senior customs 
officers are former fighters.  
 
Contrary to some other customs 
administrations in the Lake Chad 
The Chadian government 
implemented a state of 
emergency in the Lake Chad 
region, imposing curfews, 
closing the border on the 
Lake itself, prohibiting the use 
of certain means of transport 
The major threat is Boko Haram. 
The level of insecurity is 
important, but has decreased 
since 2016. 
                                                          
4  See Cantens and Raballand (2016). 
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Basin, Chadian customs remained in 
their offices despite the rise of Boko 
Haram in 2011 - particularly in Bol on 
the banks of Lake Chad, despite 
multiple incursions of armed groups 
in the area. 
 
 
(like large boats that used to 
transport commodities from 
Nigeria through the Lake). 
 
Cameroon and Nigeria closed 
the usual trade road crossing 
the northern parts of these 
countries along which 
Nigerian commodities 
transited. Consequently, 
traders use small trucks and 
new routes going through 
Niger. 
 
Traders in localities like Bol 
are organised through a 
group whose members go to 
Nigerian cities, particularly 
Lagos, to buy goods on 
behalf of the others.  
Central 
African 
Republic 
(CAR) 
 
Northern 
borders with 
Chad and 
Cameroon 
From a customs perspective, CAR 
territory is divided into three parts. 
 
State services are present along the 
road between the border with 
Cameroon (Beloko) and the capital 
Bangui. This road is the major supply 
route for the capital, where 25% of 
the national population live. 
Commodities are conveyed through 
the transit corridor from Douala port 
in Cameroon to the border post of 
Beloko, then escorted by UN military 
units accompanied by customs units. 
 
Customs and state services are not 
deployed in the eastern and northern 
part of the territory, which is ruled by 
militias (ex-Seleka). 
  
The northern and western part of the 
territory is mainly ruled by militias 
(anti-Balaka), but there is a customs 
bureau in the town of Bang at the 
extreme northern border with Chad 
and Cameroon. This bureau has 
been attacked several times.  
 
In the western part of the 
countries, apart from the 
Douala-Beloko-Bangui area 
that provides the major share 
of trade, traders circulate 
from one border to the 
hinterland depending on trade 
opportunities offered in 
Cameroon market cities 
nearby the border.  
Insecurity is widespread and 
villagers and cities are regularly 
raided by armed groups; this 
leads to local militias, who can 
become a threat to other villages 
or localities. 
 
A particularity of this situation is 
the presence of the UN 
peacekeeping mission, whose 
Blue Helmet contingents are 
located in major cities along the 
trade roads. The CAR army is not 
deployed in the field, and CAR is 
under weapons embargo.  
 
 
Sudan 
 
West Darfur, 
border with 
Chad 
The major organisational specificity 
of Sudanese customs is that they are 
part of the Ministry of Interior, which 
simplifies the lead of border 
agencies. 
 
Customs operate in the customs 
bureau of El Geneina, as well as in 
an outpost in a village located 
between El Geneina and the border 
with Sudan.  
Traders use trucks and pick-
ups. Their trade routes 
extend from Port Sudan to 
northern Nigeria, where some 
traders barter (Nigerian 
commodities for leather). 
 
Some border villages are 
areas of small-scale 
smuggling: people use small 
vehicles or donkeys to ship 
commodities between Chad 
and Sudan. 
Insecurity has been addressed 
through different ways. Former 
militants have been encouraged 
to convert their vehicles into 
means of transport for goods and 
people. An agreement between 
Sudan and Chad set up a joint 
force that has settled camps to 
protect the border town of El 
Geneina (Sudan) and the road to 
the border. 
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3  The impact of violence on trade routes 
 
Violence may or may not affect trade routes (and reduce supplies due to official border 
closures).5 However, the major driver of change may be not insecurity itself, but rather the 
state’s response to it. 
 
States adopt three kinds of responses that can be observed in the field. The first response is 
a non-response: security forces and administrations are no longer present in the 
borderlands. Security can be ensured by foreign armies (United Nations peacekeeping 
operations, or partner countries’ armies – such as France in Mali), or militias – as is the case 
in the Central African Republic. Where security is ensured by local militias, these militias can 
be composed of former civilians who ‘helped’ security forces formerly present at roadblocks 
or in villages by accomplishing small tasks officers did not do (opening the barrier, making 
registrations, collecting informal fees). However, according to some interviews in the Central 
African borderlands, these militias do not apply the same kind of informal taxation to all 
traders. They tend to favour traders who are, for instance, from the same religion, and put a 
lot of pressure on others (detaining vehicles and drivers, increasing fees).  
 
The consequence of this non-response by the state can be changes in the structure of the 
trading community, which is reshuffled according to violence in society and the domination of 
new social groups: some traders are obliged to flee the area and are replaced by those who 
are close to the ruling groups (case of Central African Republic). In this case, the trade 
routes do not change. A similar observation regarding the permanence of trade routes, for 
different reasons, has been made in northern Mali. After Algeria closed its border with Mali in 
2013 the volume of trade between Algeria and Mali decreased by two-thirds, but the closure 
did not stopped smuggling (Bensassi et al. forthcoming). The trade roads crossing the desert 
did not change, probably due to the absence of the Malian army and security forces in these 
areas. Trade routes did not change in the borderlands between Mauritania and Mali, either. 
According to various interviews and field observations, Timbuktu, for instance, is still strongly 
connected to the borderlands with Mauritania. Markets in Mauritania, a few kilometers from 
the border with Mali, supply the Timbuktu area. Violence did not dramatically modify the 
trade routes when the state was absent.6  
 
The second kind of state response to insecurity is the closure of the border and a strong 
state presence to implement the closure. There have been some major changes in trade 
routes in Chad, as the government has banned large vessels from using Lake Chad. The 
main roads between Lagos and N’djamena, by Lake Chad or by Fotokol and Kousseri in 
Cameroon, have been closed and declared military zones. Trade routes have had to be 
changed as a result, for example through Niger. These changes had two major 
consequences. 
 
Firstly, changes to trade routes have several major consequences at the local and national 
levels, one of which is a rise in the price of goods. For instance, large vessels on Lake Chad 
could transport the equivalent of three truckloads. Their ban automatically increased 
transport prices due to a change in means of transport. According to Bol residents, the price 
of basic goods has increased by 30 per cent since the ban came into force.7 New trade 
routes create new opportunities for states rather than for traders. For example, Niger has 
benefited from increased transit flows to Chad from Nigerian ports; Nigerien customs 
                                                          
5  Trade routes are a more theoretical concept, given that drivers use GPS devices in conflict-prone/volatile environments 
and continuously change their routes (see Bensassi et al. forthcoming). 
6  Armed groups require all manner of supplies (including petrol for vehicles). They consequently control checkpoints or 
levy some taxes, but do not stop trade flows. There are also anecdotes about informal taxation of drug flows (with tolls 
paid to tribes to ensure safe passage). 
7  The residents who were interviewed had been inhabitants of Bol since 2010. 
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manages the new transit flows and collects new transit fees stemming from increased transit 
flows to Chad, and goods are also taxed by Chadian customs. Niger and Chad customs 
signed an agreement to avoid this double taxation by the end of 2016.  
 
Secondly, when trade routes are reshuffled due to violence, some cities or regions 
neighbouring the fragile area may compete to attract new trade flows. This competition can 
exist between state institutions, armed groups and even cities that find new opportunities to 
be connected to border economies. It can be based on the price of providing security and 
result in competition in the cost of securing transport (formal and informal) and customs 
duties. But, the most important competition is between border towns to attract trade crossing 
conflict zones: this can have an impact on state revenue at national level. This has previously 
been described between customs bureaux (Cantens 2013), but it becomes fiercer in the case 
of regions neighbouring conflict zones. It can be driven by local authorities using customs 
offices as allies, or by customs offices themselves. The range of ‘facilitation measures’ can 
be wide: from lowering fiscal pressure (for instance, by carrying out an overall valuation of 
loads, and setting a global tax per lorry), to providing security escorts for a fee.  
 
Such competition has been observed in many countries. It can have positive consequences: 
forcing local security services to coordinate more fully to decrease informal and formal fees 
collected at roadblocks or for escorts; or forcing major offices to tailor their services and 
modernise their procedures when faced with pressure from smaller offices that want to 
attract more flows of goods. Nonetheless, it can also have negative effects: locally, an office 
can decrease fiscal pressure and then increase its revenue collection; the competition will 
force other offices to do the same, thus reducing overall tax collection. In all areas where 
borders have been closed and trade routes changed, local representatives of border regions, 
states and cities and heads of customs have to balance between: (i) securing local income 
for their region or city through taxation; (ii) not being too compliant with legislation and 
procedures with the main security actors in the field – customs, army and policy officials at 
roadblocks who may collect some informal fees; and (iii) maintaining an acceptable (informal 
and formal) tax pressure that does not discourage traders from going to neighbouring regions 
or cities to clear their goods.  
  
The third kind of local state response regarding the openness of the border is to ‘reduce’ the 
border. In some regions, like at the Tunisia-Libya border, Tunisian authorities adopted some 
restricted access to border areas, keeping few border posts open and delineating military 
zones where traffic is prohibited. The main rationale for this measure is to reduce smuggling 
and illegal entry into the country, not to deploy additional civil service resources in insecure 
areas and to keep the border open. The trade routes have not changed much. The adoption 
of this strategy seems to have been fruitful in Tunisia. From interviews with smugglers and 
customs officials, it seems that smugglers make a clear distinction between state services 
that fight against terrorism and religious armed groups operating in the borderlands whose 
ideology is supported by smugglers. This was evidenced in March 2016, when a group of 
Islamic State militants tried to take the Tunisian border city of Ben Guerdane, and were not 
supported by the population. Keeping the border open is crucial in areas where the border is 
an important economic resource, as this policy enables customs officers to maintain a good 
relationship with all kinds of local traders. According to some smugglers interviewed in 
Tunisia, their primary intellectual opposition against extreme religious ideologies is an 
important factor. The state response in such an environment mainly consists, therefore, in 
keeping cross-border traders as allies. 
 
Many security solutions applied at fragile borders have unintended consequences. Security 
solutions usually do not make any distinction between the type of flows crossing the border 
(legal or illegal trade and migration flows). In many cases, state security forces assume there 
are connections between all flows (terrorists, smugglers, drug traffickers, hauliers, migrants, 
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etc.) and apply the same level of force to all flows.8 For some policymakers or local civil 
servants operating at fragile borders there may be a link between smuggling and terrorism, 
based on, for instance, the use of the same means of transport or the same empirical 
knowledge of field conditions, or a general statement on deterministic linkages between all 
illegal activities.  
 
However, there is often no clear evidence of structural links between, for instance, terrorists 
and smugglers, or jihadists and drug traffickers (Lacher 2012). The indiscriminate use of 
force may worsen the relationship between local communities living in borderlands and civil 
servants or soldiers, who require the support of these local communities to adapt the rules to 
local circumstances, collect intelligence and help enforce security measures. 
 
As described before, some security solutions may be extreme – such as closing the border, 
or closing markets in a border city that is a trade hub. State authorities justify such measures 
to protect civil servants at the border against suicide attacks – a trade route is closed and 
border controls simplified to break the potential financial links between certain traders and 
terrorists; all attempts to cross the border are considered a potential terrorist act.  
 
Smuggling can persist and some smugglers may be connected to armed groups even in 
cases where there is no longer any formal trade activity. The escalation of state violence in 
borderlands increases the level of risk for smugglers, who may opt to smuggle high-value 
goods such as weapons or drugs. The anticipated benefits of border closures in security 
terms may consequently not be as significant as hoped, and need to be carefully assessed. 
Moreover, border closures have a huge impact locally; they can contribute to a drastic 
reduction in the transport and trade sectors – these are the main areas of employment, and 
help to reduce poverty. 
 
 
4  The response of customs to insecurity: an 
uncharacteristic yet balanced approach 
 
Customs services are often envisaged solely as national administrations, yet they play an 
important role in wealth redistribution – especially in areas where revenue from cross-border 
trade is the main economic resource. The key questions challenging customs authorities are 
the following. What role could be played by customs and, more globally, the state to support 
simultaneous development of trade and revenue collection? What impact does violence have 
on trade activities, and what are the practical responses adopted by customs to ensure trade 
and resilience? What is the role of customs in the local security framework? What practices 
does customs adopt locally to restore the authority of the state, and what are the risks 
associated with these practices? This section shares some examples of local responses, and 
the principles guiding them. 
 
4.1 Cooperation between border agencies 
  
As a preliminary observation, it is worth clarifying the scale of cooperation between border 
agencies, both national and international. Different situations have been observed, all with 
their own advantages and disadvantages. 
 
                                                          
8  Proponents of this view include Michailof (2015). This view is shared by many policymakers and representatives of aid 
agencies, whereas research in this area is much more nuanced (Lacher 2012; Cantens and Raballand 2016). This was 
confirmed through interviews. 
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The situation may differ between northern Mali and Chad: while Malian customs is limited to 
a symbolic presence in the main towns, Chadian customs still operates some customs 
offices on the frontline. However, a common feature of both countries is that the governor 
coordinates border agencies, and this coordination is implemented in practice by the army. 
Customs officers are sometimes embedded within army patrol units, enabling seizures to be 
made according to customs regulations, maintaining visible customs contact in the field, and 
giving customs officers the opportunity to patrol under reasonable security conditions. 
 
The Sudanese case is unusual from the perspective of coordination of border management. 
Customs is part of the police force, under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior, and has 
the same equipment, uniforms and powers as the police (except for specific intervention 
groups). Sudanese customs has established close cooperation with other police services in 
charge of intelligence in economic affairs. Formal exchange of information has been 
established, particularly to monitor transit movements. However, the most important positive 
step is coordination with Chad, taking the form of an agreement recently signed between 
Chad and Sudan. Joint forces have been set up at entry points to El Geneina and on the 
road to Chad, with joint patrols operating in the area. All the actors have reported that this 
agreement has led to a positive dramatic change. According to the police chief responsible 
for police and customs forces in West Darfur, there has been a ‘complete turnaround’, 
proving that international cooperation can work to ensure security when it is concretely 
implemented in the field by joint forces. 
 
Another type of cooperation deserving greater empirical exploration is the relationship 
between state services and traditional authorities (such as sultans in Sudan, heads of 
villages or tribes in Mali). The situation seems to differ from one country to another. In 
Sudan, the role of traditional authorities (like the sultans in El Geneina) appear to have 
diminished, based on interviews. This situation differs from other locations (such as Mali) 
where donors’ approaches to peacebuilding have relied mainly on the role of traditional 
authorities in the absence of the state. In northern Mali local chiefs’ authority within 
communities seems to have gradually declined; they are often considered to be an obstacle 
to development as their authority is based on traditional hierarchy. As a corollary, donors or 
state institutions run the risk of being perceived as allies of the ruling elite. 
 
There is probably not any single model for border cooperation, but three main lessons can be 
drawn at this stage. Firstly, customs are not always important actors in the national security 
schemes, apart from in Tunisia and Sudan. This is despite the fact that customs, differently 
to other security forces, have both security and economic perspectives on the crisis, 
especially in borderlands where trade is one of the major economic activities. Secondly, the 
army may be an important actor in cooperation for border management. Usually, experts 
think of border cooperation in terms of civil or paramilitary services (such as customs, police, 
border guards, health and sanitary services). However, in insecure areas the army is often 
the main actor with the technical means to patrol the borderlands. Moreover, customs share 
this ‘patrolling culture’ with the army in borderlands – as opposed to the police, which are 
more focused on urban areas. Thirdly, cooperation with the local population should be 
conducted with caution: the role of traditional and religious authorities may not be as 
important as it seems, and economic elites like traders may provide more powerful support to 
state services.  
 
4.2 The local importance of customs 
 
Despite all policymakers and experts encouraging cooperation between governmental 
agencies, the presence of the state at fragile borders also results in power struggles among 
state services. Leadership may evolve quickly due to a range of parameters: reduced 
insecurity, differing balance of power and intelligence sources. 
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Struggles between border control agencies have come to the fore in some countries, 
particularly between customs, army and police services, as they jostle to be physically 
present at ‘point zero’ of the border.9 The border agency that handles point zero may receive 
more equipment and resources from central government, especially to monitor the border 
and close it in an emergency. In one country, customs heads of office demonstrated their 
efficiency by showing that when posted to one point of entry after the army, customs officers 
increased the tonnage of seizures. As a result, the government changed the security 
framework, and gave customs the keys to the border by positioning it at point zero, granting it 
legal authority to close the border in an emergency – thus raising the profile of customs, 
locally, within the security forces. This is not necessarily a transposable model, as it depends 
on many factors that are not replicable in all countries. It does, nevertheless, show that there 
is no specific model for security policy in which customs would only be assigned a secondary 
role. 
 
In other countries, customs experiences a strengthening of its powers when cash supply is 
restricted. The availability of cash is crucial for state services where banking is less 
developed for economic reasons (size of the market, high transaction costs) or insecurity 
(absence of bank branches), where wages or bonuses are paid to civil servants in cash, and 
where local service providers to state authorities are also paid in cash. The governor or local 
government rely on cash flows to exert their authority and ensure the functioning of their own 
services. In these environments, customs is one of the main cash providers. This is one of 
the reasons why local state authorities often ask to be supported in the field by a strong 
presence of customs teams. 
 
4.3 Customs outposts as service providers and intelligence-gathering agencies 
 
In addition to a main customs office located on the main road, some customs administrations 
have set up outposts. These customs outposts are usually established near informal trade 
routes or a village where people employ basic means of smuggling. The outposts are not far 
from small military camps to keep them safe, and they may play a part in state control policy 
set up by the government. Customs outposts are usually located between the border and 
border cities.10  
 
Customs officials operating there tend to tolerate petty smuggling for various reasons – 
sometimes due to corruption, but also in order to avoid the risk of riots or creating political 
instability by blindly applying the same tax burden to all. Importers are not allowed, by law, to 
clear their goods at outposts. Customs officers usually give a laissez-passer to cargo or 
vehicle owners, asking them to go to the main customs office to clear their goods. 
 
In two countries there has also been an explicit policy to build customs posts near the border 
that would provide local people with services, such as telephone and electricity. This kind of 
policy used to exist during colonial times, when outposts were intended to attract nomadic 
people or travellers for control, taxation or intelligence purposes. This has produced results in 
one country, in particular. On one occasion customs officers operating at the outpost were 
informed that two terrorists were about to cross the border, and this led to their capture. It 
also shows that customs now considers its mission to be intelligence-gathering, rather than 
collecting revenue and punishing smugglers.  
 
  
                                                          
9  The administration at point zero is located at the geographical location of the border, and is the first to deal with flows of 
individuals and goods entering the territory. 
10  In many developing and emerging countries there are ‘border cities’ that are not necessarily located at the border, but 
attract cross-border flows because they provide different services such as fuel, mechanical repairs and markets. 
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4.4 Customs officers as local facilitators  
 
At all fragile borders, when the border is open customs plays a role as interface-negotiator-
peacemaker between traders/hauliers and the national or foreign public authorities. This role 
is crucial, because it grants legitimacy to the state after an outbreak of conflict. During a 
group interview one broker said that ‘customs cooperates’ – meaning, in that context, that 
other authorities do not, particularly local authorities.  
 
In almost all fragile borderlands, customs officers benefit from an informal agreement with 
headquarters granting them flexibility to make the fiscal burden on traders acceptable. This 
forms part of the trade facilitation role conducted by customs and is developed locally and 
empirically, even though more research is needed to show its relevance and highlight the 
associated risks – particularly corruption and tax evasion. Customs officers and importers 
meet regularly to agree on the acceptable tax burden, in order to avoid smuggling and 
corruption.  
 
A final observation on customs’ role as an intermediary is linked to the relationship between 
traders and foreign administrations. For instance, Sudanese traders have an accurate grasp 
of the level of taxation that can be leveraged by the Sudanese government on Chadian 
traders, and the ‘unfairness’ prompted by the asymmetry of taxation on each side of the 
border. A Sudanese trader complained that Chad levies taxes on goods in transit without 
issuing any receipt, and suggested that Sudan also levy taxes on transit goods. The role of 
customs as an intermediary between Sudanese traders and foreign authorities was 
particularly striking during a meeting organised in Adré (Chad). The meeting brought together 
two delegations from Chad and Sudan, both comprising customs officials and traders. The 
traders – whether Chadian or Sudanese – were quick to take the floor and describe their 
difficulties to the authorities. Some public service representatives also presented cases of 
traders being blocked by customs on the other side of the border. The fact that traders were 
accompanied by customs officials gave them symbolic power to negotiate and publicly air 
their grievances. This kind of meeting is remarkable in terms of the transparency it brings to 
trade issues, and can be a good way of easing tensions in areas affected by violence. 
 
4.5 A conflict between the autonomy of officials and the law? 
 
Negotiating local tax collection by national administrations needs to include a strong 
reflection on corruption. Although negotiating import values locally may not comply with 
international standards, it can prove efficient in a context where there is limited 
documentation and where trade is the main local economic resource. It could be argued that 
bargaining could encourage corruption, since the tax burden is negotiated directly between 
local actors who are in daily contact. On the other hand, it could also be a way to reduce 
corruption by making customs clearance processes transparently uniform (goods are usually 
cleared by the lorry- or car-load –sometimes based on the type of goods). 
 
If some sort of autonomy should be given, locally, to officers to provide adaptive responses 
to insecurity through taxation, the potential risks of such autonomy should be evaluated. 
Indeed, as has been observed in Northern Mali (Cantens et Raballand 2016), the defiance of 
populations against the state is high due to the corruption, and sometimes violence, of state 
services. An economic operator in the northern region of Mali described himself as a 
‘republican trader’, complying with the rules, and he clearly described why corruption creates 
inequality, difficulties for newcomers to access the border economies, and reproduction of 
elites. The bargaining process should not, therefore, create the conditions to restore a 
corrupt state, which would guarantee that the same violent claims would emerge sooner or 
later. Some solutions may exist that contradict current policies, particularly regarding the 
deployment of material resources in fragile environments. The central administrations are 
very often reluctant to send resources to fragile areas, arguing that these resources would be 
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destroyed or stolen, providing more resources to armed groups. This point is very often an 
internal source of conflict between local officials serving in fragile borderlands and 
headquarters.  
 
In many countries, autonomy that is granted locally to officers is evaluated through two 
criteria: achievement of revenue targets (common to all customs bureaux in developing 
countries and encouraging competition among them (Cantens 2012)), and, more specifically, 
the fact that economic operators – who can be former militants of armed groups – do not 
complain and themselves engage in violence.  
 
4.6 A conflict between local and national taxation? 
 
The practices described above may be valuable in restoring a peaceful relationship between 
state services and economic operators. However, they may also raise an apparent conflict 
between local and national taxation. Customs is a national administration, but we have seen 
that its local representatives operate with pragmatism, enjoying a degree of informal or 
formal flexibility granted by the central authority. But locally there are political authorities 
(municipality, local state in a federal state, governorates), local bureaucracies that have the 
power and capability to levy taxes (on transport, markets) that affect traders. If primacy is to 
be given to the local dimension in fragile borderlands, what should be the relationship 
between local and national taxation schemes? On the one hand, it can be argued that locally 
the geographical proximity between taxpayers and those who spend taxes (mayors, 
governors, local governments) encourages accountability and transparency. On the other 
hand, and employing the same proximity-based rationale, one could argue that closer and 
tighter connections between elite taxpayers (who are the main local contributors) and local 
political elites can also provide an opportunity for more patronage and corruption.  
 
To some extent customs plays a political role by locally tailoring the tax burden in the interest 
of stability, and, in some cases, its procedures and outcomes (valuation, quantity 
assessments) are used as inputs for local tax assessments. In other cases, the local 
authority may even levy a new tax and ask customs to collect it. Some interviews with traders 
have shown that they tend to place greater trust in customs (as its procedures and 
assessments do not vary and customs cooperates) than in local authorities that have been 
described as more ‘resourceful’ in terms of tax pressure.  
 
This potential conflict between local and national levels illustrates the importance of taxation 
in crisis resolution: taxation can play a role in building trust between people and local 
authorities. It is important to highlight this dimension in the nexus of security and 
development: the restoration of taxation is a strong political leverage to rebuild the 
relationship between people and authorities, and the local role of national administrations is 
crucial in this regard (Moore 2007). 
 
 
5  Conclusions and areas for further research 
to improve governance and taxation at borders 
 
This paper has attempted to present some observations from borders in conflict areas. There 
are some obvious limits to the observations, with no quantitative analysis. It shows just how 
idiosyncratic borderlands are, and how a military solution will not lead to development in 
those regions (Cantens et Raballand 2016). In this context, customs has a major role to play 
even though it needs to adapt to local situations and local rules. Customs can greatly 
contribute to a transitional state by providing an economic perspective to policymakers. The 
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state’s presence should balance economic activities, the rule of law and acceptance of the 
state by local people. 
 
The concept of trade facilitation may take on a new meaning in fragile border regions: 
facilitating trade has a political dimension, enabling the state to restore its authority by 
creating equal conditions of access to trade in areas where the border is an economic 
resource for the local population, as opposed to armed groups whose policies and actions 
are based on discrimination and inequality. 
 
In addition to these ideas, which need to be described with greater accuracy, some further 
questions remain.  
 
The first question is about the circulation of cash and, more generally, currencies near 
borders (and beyond) – and money laundering. The latter connects fragile borderlands where 
profits are generated (due to smuggling and drug or weapons trafficking), and capital cities 
where the profits are invested. This situation creates a trade-off for the authorities, observed 
in some countries, between generally turning a blind eye to investigating money laundering, 
because the currency comes from a conflict-prone zone far from the capital and has been 
reinvested in the capital, and combating money laundering with the concomitant risk that 
profits are no longer invested in the country. In any event, currency movements related to 
informal financing (using, for example, hawala systems11) deserve more attention, to 
understand how they do or do not contribute to trade facilitation and their related risks. 
 
The second question is the relationship between smuggling and terrorism. This link, often 
upheld by policymakers, is sometimes based on anecdotes of individuals being involved in 
both activities, and on a general assumption that terrorists and smugglers cross borders 
illegally, have the same means of transport (pick-up vehicles) and the same knowledge of 
the natural environment. There clearly are cases of smugglers who become involved in 
terrorist activities, though many questions remain: are the connections anecdotal or 
structural? In which terrorist activities are smugglers involved (getting terrorists across 
borders? Transporting weapons? Providing funding through smuggling of illegal goods? 
Using commercial fraud to generate extra profits that are invested in terrorist activities? What 
are the processes that lead smugglers to become involved in terrorist activities? If these 
questions are not addressed, we run the risk of considering all smugglers as potential 
terrorists, and deserving the same level of state force as terrorists. Nevertheless, those who 
are not involved in terrorist activities can be considered as potential allies of security services 
– for intelligence purposes, due to their knowledge of the territory and their capacity to 
infiltrate illegal activities. The systematic linkage between smuggling and terrorism is based 
on economic reasoning, and ignores the ideological dimension of terrorism: some smugglers 
we met during the mission are strongly ideologically opposed to the terrorists’ political 
objectives and religious convictions.  
 
Finally, borders and cross-border trade could potentially be considered a wealth creation tool 
leading to conflict resolution. As an example, border activities could offer a solution in a post-
conflict period by involving former fighters in licit economic activities.12 As the fighters’ own 
vehicles (such as four-wheel drive pick-ups) are suitable in many cases to transport goods 
during a post-conflict period, governments can offer them some opportunities to use their 
vehicles for commercial purposes.  
  
                                                          
11  See Jost and Sandhu (2003) for further details. 
12  This idea of borders as ‘production of joint gains’ is advocated by Schulze (2015). 
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Appendix13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
13  Sources of data for mapping the events are the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data database (ACLED, Raleigh 
2010) and the OpenStreetMap project. 
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